Frege's Grundgesetze ([18], [20] ) was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension schema are consistent ([41], [29] , [17] ). One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem (Theorem 2.10) shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which defines a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to Gödel's constructible universe of sets, which Gödel famously used to show the relative consistency of the continuum hypothesis ([23, 24, 25]). More specifically, our proofs appeal to Kripke and Platek's idea of the projectum within the constructible universe ([38], [42] ) as well as Jensen's uniformization theorem ([35]). The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles ([10]), and the other primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension (Theorem 3.5). As an application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting.
Introduction
There has been a recent renewed interest in the technical facets of Frege's Grundgesetze ( [8] , [10] ) paralleling the long-standing interest in Frege's philosophy of mathematics and logic ( [14] , [3] ). This interest has been engendered by the consistency proofs, due to Parsons [41] , Heck [29] , and Ferreira-Wehmeier [17] , of this system with limited amounts of comprehension. The broader intellectual interest in Frege's Grundgesetze stems in part from the two related ways in which it was a predecessor of contemporary set theory: first, the system was originally designed to be able to reconstruct much of ordinary mathematics, and second it comes equipped with the resources needed to define a membership relation. Given this close connection to contemporary set theory, it is natural to ask how much set theory can be consistently developed within these fragments of the Grundgesetze. Our main theorem (Theorem 2.10) shows it is possible within some models of these fragments to recover all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of the power set axiom. To make this precise, one needs to carefully set out the primitives of the consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze and indicate what precisely it means to recover a fragment of set theory. This is the primary goal of §2 of the paper.
Following Wright and Hale ([27] , cf. [10] ), the system of the Grundgesetze has been studied in recent decades as a special case of so-called abstraction principles. These are principles that postulate lower-order representatives for equivalence relations on higher-order entities. Many of these principles are inconsistent with full comprehension, which intuitively says that every formula determines a concept or higher-order entity. So as with the Grundgesetze, the idea has been to look for consistency with respect to the so-called predicative instances of the comprehension schema, in which the presence of higher-order quantifiers within formulas is highly restricted. Of course, while predicativity in connection with the Grundgesetze is a fairly new topic, predicativity has a long tradition within mathematical logic, beginning with Poincaré, Russell, and Weyl ([32] , [52] ), and found in our day in the work of Feferman ( [16, 15] ) and in the system ACA 0 of Friedman and Simpson's project of reverse mathematics ( [21] , [48] ).
The other chief theorem of this paper (Theorem 3.5) shows that an abstraction principle associated to an equivalence relation is consistent with predicative comprehension so long as the equivalence relation is provably an equivalence relation in a weak background secondorder logic. One application of this result is a resolution to the joint consistency problem in the predicative setting. For, in the setting of full comprehension, it has been known for some time that there are abstraction principles which are individually but not jointly consistent. Our results show that this cannot happen in the setting of predicative comprehension, so long as each of the equivalence relations is provably an equivalence relation in a weak background second-order logic. In §3, we define the notion of an abstraction principle and further contextualize our results within the extant literature on abstraction principles.
The methods used in all these results draw on considerations related to Gödel's constructible universe of sets. Whereas in the cumulative hierarchy of sets V α , one proceeds by iterating the operation of the powerset into the transfinite, in the constructible hierarachy of sets L α , one proceeds by iterating the operation of taking definable subsets into the transfi-nite. Gödel showed that just like the universe of sets V = α V α is a model of the axioms of set theory, so the constructible universe of sets L = α L α is a model of the axioms of set theory, along with a strong form of the axiom of choice according to which the elements of L are well-ordered by a relation < L (cf. [23, 24, 25] , [34] Chapter 13, [39] Chapter 6, [40] II.6, [13] ).
Our present understanding of the more "local" or "micro" properties of the constructible sets was furthered by the work of Kripke ([38] ), Platek ( [42] ) and Jensen ([35] ), in whose results we find the key ideas of the projectum and uniformization. Roughly, a level L α of the constructible hierarchy satisfies uniformization if whenever it satisfies ∀ x ∃ y R(x, y) then there is a definable function f of the same level of complexity as R which satisfies ∀ x R(x, f (x)). The projectum, on the other hand, is related to the idea that certain initial segments L α of the constructible universe can be shrunk via a definable injection ι : L α → ρ to a smaller ordinal ρ < α. The formal definitions of the projectum and uniformization are given in §5.
It's actually rather natural to think that these two methods would be useful in producing models of abstraction principles. On the one hand, given an equivalence relation E on the set P (ρ) ∩ L α , we can conceive of the elements of this set as higher-order entities, and then we can take the lower-order representative in ρ of an E-equivalence class to be the injection ι applied to the < L -least element of E's equivalence class. On the other hand, uniformization allows one to secure further instances of the comprehension schema in which there are some controlled occurrences of higher-order quantifiers, in essence because one can use uniformization to choose one particular higher-order entity with which to work.
This, in any case, is the intuitive idea behind the proof of our theorem on the consistency of abstraction principles (Theorem 3.5) which we prove in §5. However, this does not itself deliver our result on how much set theory one can recover in the consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze. For this, we need to additionally show that if we start from a level of the constructible hierarchy which satisfies certain axioms of set theory, and if we perform the construction of a model of the fragment of the Grundgesetze in the manner intimated in the above paragraph and made precise in §5, then we can recover these original constructible sets definably within the model of the fragment of the Grundgesetze. The details of this argument are carried out in §6 where our Main Theorem 2.10 is finally established. This paper is the first in a series of three papers -the other two being [51] , [50] -which collectively constitute a sequel to our paper [49] . In that earlier paper [49] , we gave a proof of the consistency of Frege's Grundgesetze system with limited amounts of comprehension using tools from hyperarithmetic theory (cf. [1] Chapters 4-5). However, we were unable to use these models to ascertain how much Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory could be consistently done in the Fregean setting. The work in this paper explains why this was the case. It turns out that the key to this was an axiom known as Axiom Beta (cf. Definition 4.6), which effectively ensures that the Mostowski Collapse Theorem holds in a structure. As one can see by inspection of the proofs in §6, it is being able to invoke this theorem in a model which allows us to obtain finally the Main Theorem 2.10. It turns out that the models associated to hyperarithmetic theory simply are not models of Axiom Beta (cf. Theorem 5.2 in contrast to Theorem 5.3).
This present paper does not depend on results from our earlier paper [49] , nor does it depend on its two thematically-linked companion papers [51] , [50] . In the first companion paper [51] , we examine the deductive strength of the theory consisting of all the predicative abstraction principles whose consistency we establish here. In the second companion paper [50] , we use the constructible hierarchy to develop models of an intensional type theory, roughly analogous to how one can use the cumulative hierarchy to build models of an extensional type theory. This intensional type theory can in turn interpret fragments of the Grundgesetze system, and so stands to the predicative Grundgesetze system as the stage axioms of Shoenfield [45, 46, 47] and Boolos [4] stands to the Zermelo-Fraenkel system.
The Grundgesetze and Its Set Theory
Basic Law V is the crucial fifth axiom of Frege's Grundgesetze ( [18] ), and it axiomatizes the behavior of a certain type-lowering operator from second-order entities to first-order entities, called the "extension operator." In Frege's type-theory, the second-order entities are called "concepts" while the first-order entities are called "objects," so that the extension operator ∂ takes a concept X and returns an object ∂(X). (There is no standard notation for the extension operator, and so some authors write §(X) in lieu of ∂(X)). Basic Law V then simply postulates that the extension operator is injective:
Here the identity of concepts is regarded as extensional in character, so that two concepts X, Y are said to be identical precisely when they are coextensive, i.e. X = Y if and only if for all objects z we have that Xz if and only if Y z.
In saying this, the expression "W z" is read as "W is predicated of z" and is intended to model the natural-language predications such as "Wisdom is predicated of Zeno" or "Zeno is wise." Of course, this is handled formally by including in the signature a primitive binary relation R(W, z) ≡ W z that holds only between a concept W and an object z. In the metatheory, any model of Basic Law V is isomorphic to a model in which the predication relation W z is modeled by the membership relation from the ambient set theory, so that W z holds in the model if and only if z ∈ W holds in the metatheory. Hence, often in what follows we will simply effect this blending of the object language and metalanguage and assume that we may write the object-language predication relation in terms of the metalanguage membership relation.
So, up to isomorphism, models of Basic Law V have the following form:
wherein M is a non-empty set that serves as the interpretation of the objects, and the set S n (M ) ⊆ P (M n ) serves as the interpretation of the n-ary concepts, and wherein the function ∂ : S 1 (M ) → M is an injection. Further, per the discussion in the previous paragraph, we assume that in the object-language of the structure from equation (2.2) we have the resources to describe when an n-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ) from M n is in an n-ary concept R, and we write this in the object-language alternatively as R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) or (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ R.
As is well-known, Basic Law V is inconsistent with the full second-order comprehension schema:
Definition 2.1. The Full Comprehension Schema consists of the all axioms of the form ∃ R ∀ a (Ra ↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula, perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x).
To see the inconsistency of full comprehension and Basic Law V, it merely suffices to instantiate the above schema with respect to ϕ(x) ≡ ∃ Y (∂(Y ) = x & ¬Y x) and then to ask whether or not ∂(X) ∈ X. In spite of this inconsistency, Parsons and Heck ([41] , [29] ) showed that Basic Law V is consistent with the version of the comprehension schema in which ϕ(x) contains no second-order quantifiers: Definition 2.2. The First-Order Comprehension Schema consists of all axioms of the form ∃ R ∀ a (Ra ↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula with no second-order quantifiers but perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x).
For instance, if M is any infinite first-order structure and D(M n ) = Defn(M n ) is its collection of first-order definable-with-parameters subsets, then the structure 
wherein the formula ϕ(R , x) is Σ 1 1 , perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y abbreviates (y 1 , . . . , y m ) and R is an (n + m)-ary concept variable for n, m ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(R , x) where R is an m-ary concept variable.
Here, as is usual, a Σ 1 1 -formula (resp. Π 1 1 -formula) is one which begins with a block of existential quantifiers (resp. universal quantifiers) over n-ary concepts for various n ≥ 1 and which contains no further second-order quantifiers. Given this variety of comprehension schemata, it becomes expedient to explicitly distinguish between different formal theories that combine these schemata with the axiom Basic Law V from equation (2.1). In particular, one defines the following systems (cf. 
2).
We opt to designate the subsystem formed with Σ 1 1 -Choice by inverting the letters "BL" to "LB", since this convention saves us from needing to write out the word "choice" when referring to a theory, and since it is compatible with the convention in subsystems of secondorder arithmetic ( [48] ), wherein the ∆ In the companion paper [51] , we work deductively in theories containing limited amounts of comprehension. In these situations, it will prove expedient to consider an enrichment of the above theories by the addition of certain function symbols. In particular, we assume that for every m, n > 0 we have a (m + 1)-ary function symbol in the language for the map (R, a 1 , . . . , a m ) → R[a 1 , . . . , a n ] from a single (m + n)-ary relation R and an m-tuple of objects (a 1 , . . . , a m ) to the n-ary relation
This addition to the signature impacts the axiom system because we continue to assume that we have Σ 1 -choice and first-order comprehension. So the inclusion of the function symbols (R, a 1 , . . . , a m ) → R[a 1 , . . . , a n ] in the signature then adds to the collection of terms of the signature, which in turn adds to the collection of quantifier-free and hence first-order formulas of the signature.
Let us call this expansion of Σ 
In building models of these consistent fragments of Frege's system, one of our chief aims is to understand how much set theory can be thereby recovered. The crucial idea here can be traced back to Frege, who noted how one could define an ersatz membership-relation η in terms of the extension operator and predication:
Since the extensions are precisely the objects in the range of the extension operator ∂, we write the collection of extensions as rng(∂). Now it follows from considerations related to the Russell paradox that rng(∂) is not a concept in the presence of ∆ In what follows, we freely use the abbreviations {x : ϕ(x)} for the concept consisting of all those objects satisfying the formula ϕ(x), provided that we know by reference to one of the comprehension schema which we have available that there is such a concept. Likewise, we use X ∩Y , X ∪Y , X ⊆ Y , {x, y}, {x} as abbreviations for the obvious concepts that we can form by recourse to first-order comprehension, and we use X ⊆ Y as an abbreviation for inclusion amongst concepts. Likewise, we use abbreviations like X ⊆ rng(∂) to indicate that every object in the concept X is an extension, and X ∩ rng(∂) = ∅ to indicate that some object in the concept X is an extension, keeping in mind all the while that rng(∂) itself does not form a concept.
The following elementary proposition, provable in Σ 1 1 -LB, is both illustrative of the η-relation, and is an important tool in studying the η-relation which we use repeatedly in what follows. Basically, it says that for subconcepts of rng(∂), the η-relation restricted to this concept exists as a binary concept:
there is a binary concept R such that for all a, we have that Xa implies ∂(R[a]) = a. So for all X ⊆ rng(∂) there is a binary relation E X ⊆ V × X such that Xa implies:
Proof. Suppose that we have X ⊆ rng(∂). Then for all a if X(a) then there there is A such that ∂(A) = a. Then by Σ It will also be helpful in what follows to have some fixed notation for subset and successor. So similar to equation (2.7) we define the associated Fregean subset relation ⊆ η as follows:
However, note that if a is not an extension, then cηa is always false and so (cηa → ψ) is always true, regardless of what ψ is. Hence, if a is not an extension, then a ⊆ η b is always true. So the expressions aηb and a ⊆ η b will behave like membership and subset only if one restricts attention to a, b, that are extensions. In what follows, it will also be useful to introduce some notation for a successor-like operation on extensions. So let us say that
However, this function is not total, and in particular it should be emphasized that σ(x) is only well-defined when x is an extension. Accordingly, the graph of the function x → σ(x) does not exist as a concept, since if it did, then its domain would likewise exist, and its domain is precisely rng(∂). However, when σ(x) is defined, note that it satisfies zη(σ(x)) iff either zηx or z = x. This of course reminds us of the usual set-theoretic successor operation x → (x ∪ {x}).
In the axiomatic development of systems related to Σ 1 1 -LB, the crucially important concept is the notion of transitive closure. If F is a concept, then let us say that F is η-transitive or η-closed if (F x & yηx) implies F y, for all x, y. Then we define transitive closure as follows:
Frege used a similar notion, which he called the ancestral, to define the natural numbers as the intersection of all the concepts that contained an ersatz of zero and are closed under an ersatz-successor relation (cf. [12] pp. 138 ff, and the notion of an "inductive set" in [49] Theorem 20 pp. 1689-90). The intuitive idea behind the formula Trcl η (x) is that it holds of all those first-order objects y which are in every η-transitive concept F which are η-supersets of x. This is of course the natural generalization of the classical transitive closure trcl(x) operator from classical set theory, which is defined as the smallest transitive superset of x, or equivalently as the set of all y such that there is a finite ∈-chain y = x 0 ∈ x 1 ∈ · · · ∈ x n = x (cf. [39] p. 99, [40] p. 45, [34] p. 64). It is easily provable that Trcl η (x) also has these properties:
2.
Transitive Closure is an η-superclass: wηx implies (Trcl η (x))(w).
So now we may describe the procedure for carving out a model of a fragment of classical set theory ZFC from a model of M of Σ 1 1 -LB. Since the foundation axiom is a traditional part of ZFC, we want to ensure that our fragments always include this axiom, and for this purpose it is important that we avoid infinite descending η-chains. Since M has second-order resources, this can be effected in a straightforward manner. In particular, if X ⊆ M and R ⊆ X × X are M-definable (but not necessarily an elements of S k (M )), then let us say that "(X , R) is well-founded in M" if M models that every non-empty subconcept of X has an R-least member, i.e. M models the following:
A special case of this is when X is a concept and R is a binary concept, in which case we likewise define "(X, R) is well-founded in M" to mean that M models that every non-empty subconcept of X has an R-least element, i.e that M models
Since S 1 (M ) is in general a small subset of P (M ), we need to be wary of inferring in general from "(X, R) is well-founded in M" to (X, R) having no infinite descending R-chains, or to (X, R) having no infinite M-definable descending R-chains. Of course, there are natural axiom schemes which ensure that any infinite descending R-chains will not be M-definable. So we define the following axiom schema, whose name comes from its close connection to the set-theoretic axiom Axiom Beta from §4 (Definition 4.6):
Definition 2.9. Aβ is the following schema, where ϕ(x) ranges over formulas in the signature:
Hence, the schema Aβ simply says that if the pair (X, R) of concepts is well-founded in the sense that every non-empty subconcept of X has a R-least element, then it is also wellfounded in the sense that any non-empty M-definable subclass of X has a R-least element. In what follows, if we use the term "well-founded" in the object-language of a model M of Σ 1 1 -LB, it has the sense of equations (2.12)-(2.13). Sometimes in what follows, and particularly in the proofs in §6, we also need to appeal to claims to the effect that certain relations on sets as defined in the metatheory are well-founded in the metatheory, in that nonempty subsets of them have least elements. However, context will always make clear which sense of well-foundedness is at issue.
Finally, putting this all together, let us define the notion of a "well-founded extension":
Given a model M of Σ 1 1 -LB, let us define its collection of well-founded extensions as follows:
In broad analogy with its usage in set theory, we shall sometimes refer to this as the inner model of well-founded extensions relative to a model of Σ 1 1 -LB. The other definition that we need in order to state and prove our results is a global choice principle. Suppose that T is a theory in one of our signatures. Then we let T + GC be the expansion of T by a new binary relation symbol < on objects in the signature, with axioms saying that < is a linear order of the first-order objects, and we additionally have a schema in the expanded signature saying that any instantiated formula ϕ(x) in the expanded signature, perhaps containing parameters, that holds of some first-order object x will hold of a <-least element:
Since all our theories T contain first-order comprehension (cf. Definition 2.2), and since instances of < are quantifier-free and hence first-order, we have that the graph of < forms a binary concept in T + GC. Of course the postulated binary relation < does not necessarily have anything to do with the usual "less than" relation on the natural numbers.
With this all notation in place, our main theorem can be expressed as follows, wherein P denotes the power set axiom:
This result is proven at the close of §6. It is significant primarily because it shows us what kind of set theory may be consistently developed if one takes Basic Law V as a primitive. Now, one subtlety should be mentioned here at the outset: in the absence of power set, it is not entirely obvious which form of replacement and which form of choice is optimal. The discussion in Gitman-Hamkins-Johnstone ( [22] ), which builds on Zarach ( [53, 54] ), suggests that instead of the replacement schema one should use the collection schema, and as for the axiom of choice one should use the principle that every set can be well-ordered; the reason in each case being that these are the deductively stronger principles in the absence of powerset. For a formal statement of the collection schema, see Definition 4.1. As we will note when establishing our main theorem in §6, our models satisfy these principles as well. Hence, for the sake of concreteness, in this paper we may define ZFC-P as follows: Definition 2.11. ZFC-P is the theory consisting of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, separation, collection, foundation, and the statement that every set can be well-ordered.
For precise definitions of these axioms, one may consult any standard set theory textbook ( [39, 40] , [34] ), although the various schemata will be reviewed at the outset of §4.
The Main Theorem 2.10 is a natural analogue of the work of Boolos, Hodes, and Cook's on the axiom "New V" ( [5] , [33] , [9] ). This is the axiom in the signature of Basic Law V, but where, for the sake of disambiguation, we write the type-lowering operator with the symbol ∂ as opposed to ∂. The axiom New V then says that
Here Small(X) is an abbreviation for the statement that X is not bijective with the universe of first-order objects {x :
To see the connection between New V and ZFC, recall that for a cardinal κ, the set H κ is defined as H κ = {x : |trcl(x)| < κ} (cf. [39] §IV.6 pp. 130 ff, [40] p. 78, [34] p. 171). Suppose that κ > ω is regular and satisfies |H κ | = κ. In this circumstance, let us define:
where ∂ (X) = 1, X if |X| < κ and ∂ (X) = 0, 0 otherwise (wherein ·, · is the usual set-theoretic pairing function). Then in analogue to Frege's definition of membership in equation (2.7), we can define a quasi-membership relation η in models of New V as follows:
Likewise, we can define wfExt using the relation η just as wfExt is defined in equation (2.15) using the relation η. Then one may prove that H κ is a model of New V and (wfExt (H κ ), η ) is isomorphic to (H κ , ∈), which is known to model ZFC-P when κ > ω is regular (cf. [39] Theorem IV. This result is from the aforementioned work of Boolos, Hodes, and Cook and we do not reproduce its proof here. This result is mentioned only to further contextualize the Main Theorem 2.10, which establishes an analogous result for Basic Law V in the setting of limited amounts of comprehension.
Predicative Abstraction Principles
The axioms Basic Law V and New V are examples of what are now called abstraction principles. If E(R, S) is a formula of second-order logic with exactly two free n-ary relation variables for some n ≥ 1 then the abstraction principle A[E] associated to E is the following axiom in a signature expanded by a new function symbol ∂ E from n-ary relations to objects:
Abstraction principles have been studied extensively for many decades. For an introduction to this subject, see Burgess [8] , and for the important papers by authors such as Wright, Hale, Boolos, Heck, see the collections edited by Demopoulos [11] and Cook [10] . The first thing that one observes in this subject is that some abstraction principles are consistent with the Full Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.1) while others are not. For instance, we saw above that Basic Law V (2.1) is inconsistent with the Full Comprehension Schema. A famous example of an abstraction principle which is consistent with the Full Comprehension Schema is Hume's Principle, which is the abstraction principle associated to the equivalence relation that says E(X, Y ) if and only if there is a bijection f : X → Y .
Given that some abstraction principles are consistent with the full comprehension schema while others are not, it is natural to ask whether there is any general method for determining whether A[E] is consistent with the Full Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.1). Heck [31] noted that, given any sentence Φ of second-order logic, one could consider the following formula E Φ (X, Y ): Given that Basic Law V is consistent with weaker forms of comprehension, one may ask whether there is any general method for determining whether the abstraction principle A[E] is consistent with these weaker forms of comprehension. In answering this question, it's helpful to have specific names for the theories consisting of combinations of the abstraction principle A[E] with the weaker forms of comprehension: Definition 3.1. For each formula E(R, S) with exactly two free n E -ary variables R, S for a specific n E ≥ 1, let the theory ∆ Further, let us define: Here the abbreviation "SO" is chosen because it reminds us of "second-order logic." As with the fragments of Basic Law V discussed in the previous sections, we're assuming that we have the function symbols (a, R) → R[a] from equation (2.5) in the signature of the theories
Our chief results on these theories are the following: Theorem 3.3. Suppose that n ≥ 1 and that E(R, S) is a formula in the signature of Σ 1 1 -OS which is provably an equivalence relation on n-ary concepts in
Hence, the fact that Basic Law V is consistent with the ∆ 1 1 -comprehension schema and Σ 1 1 -choice schema is not an isolated phenomena, but follows from the fact that E(X, Y ) ≡ X = Y is provably an equivalence relation in a weak second-order logic.
A related problem of long-standing interest has been the "joint consistency problem." This is the problem of determining natural conditions on
] has a standard model. A second-order theory is said to have a standard model if it has a model M satisfying S n (M ) = P (M n ) for all n ≥ 1, where we here employ the notation introduced in the previous section in equation (2. 2) for models. This is a non-trivial problem: for, some A[E 1 ] have standard models M only when the underlying first-order domain M is finite, such as when E 1 (X, Y ) is expressive of the symmetric difference of X and Y being Dedekind-finite (cf. [6] p. 215, [27] pp. 289 ff). However, other A[E 2 ] have a standard model M with underlying first-order domain M only when M is infinite, such as when E 2 (X, Y ) is expressive of X, Y being bijective.
In the setting of limited amounts of comprehension, the most obvious analogue of the joint consistency problem is to ask about the extent to which it is consistent that
has a model satisfying e.g. the ∆ Our result Theorem 3.3 from above is a direct consequence of the following theorem, which indicates that the joint consistency problem does not arise in the setting with limited amounts of comprehension, assuming that we can prove the formulas are equivalence relations in our weak background second-order logic: Theorem 3.5. (Joint Consistency Theorem) Suppose that n 1 , . . . , n k ≥ 1 and that the formula E 1 (R, S), . . . , E k (R, S) in the signature of the weak background second-order logic Σ 
This result is proven in §5 below. By compactness, it establishes the consistency of a theory which includes abstraction principles associated to each formula in the signature of our weak background second-order logic which one can prove to be an equivalence relation in our weak background second-order logic. In our companion paper [51] , we call this theory the predicative Fregean theory PFT, and in that paper we study its deductive strength.
A Generalization of Kripke-Platek Set Theory
The aim of this section is to briefly review several of the tools from constructibility that we use in the below proofs. Hence, it might be advisable to skip this section on a first read-through and refer back to this section as needed. In this section, we work entirely with fragments and extensions of the standard ZFC-set theory, so that all structures M are structures in the signature of set-theory. The tools which we review and describe in this section come from constructibility, the study of Gödel's universe L (cf. [23, 24, [13] ). This is the union of the sets L α that are defined recursively as follows, wherein Defn(M ) refers to the subsets of M which are definable with parameters (when M is conceived of as having, as its only primitive, the membership relation restricted to its elements):
One tool which we shall use frequently in this paper is a natural generalization KP n of KripkePlatek set theory KP (cf. Definition 4.4 below). The theory KP is a fragment of ZFC such that L α models KP if and only if α > ω is a limit and L α models a Σ 1 -analogue of the replacement schema called the Σ 1 -collection schema. The motivation for KP n is that L α models KP n if and only if α > ω is a limit and L α models a Σ n -analogue of the replacement schema and the Σ n-1 -version of the separation schema. More formally, let us build up to formally defining KP n (in Definition 4.2 below) by recalling the formal statements of the following schemata:
The Collection Schema:
The Local Collection Schema:
The Induction Schema:
The Separation Schema, wherein y does not appear free in ϕ:
The Replacement Schema:
Recall that a formula is Σ n (resp. Π n ) for n ≥ 1 if it begins with a block of alternating quantifiers of length n, starting with an existential quantifier (resp. universal quantifier) and after this block it contains no unbounded quantifiers but only bounded quantifiers of the form "∀ x ∈ v " and "∃ x ∈ v "; and the class Σ 0 = Π 0 = ∆ 0 is the class of formulas that contains only bounded quantifiers. For any one of these schemas and any class Γ ∈ {Σ, Π}, the Γ-version of this schema is simply the restriction to instances of the schema wherein the formula ϕ comes from the class. Note that for any class Γ ∈ {Σ, Π}, we have that trivially Γ nlocal collection implies Γ n -collection and Γ n -replacement. Finally the ∆ n -separation schema is the following schema, where ϕ is Σ n and ψ is Π n , and wherein the variable y does not appear free in either ϕ or ψ:
So with these definitions in place, we can then define our generalization of Kripke-Platek set theory: Definition 4.2. For each n ≥ 1, n-th level Kripke-Platek set theory or KP n is the theory consisting of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, the induction schema, Σ n -collection, and Σ n-1 -separation.
Hence, for limit α > ω, the structure L α models KP n if and only if it models Σ n -collection and Σ n-1 -separation. It's also worth noting the following equivalence with the theory ZFC-P (cf. Definition 2.11). This equivalence follows since the induction schema and the axiom of foundation are equivalent in the presence of the full separation schema: Proposition 4.3. ZFC-P proves ϕ if and only if KP n + C proves ϕ for some n ≥ 1, where C denotes the axiom that every set can be well-ordered.
Further, the theory KP 1 is provably equivalent to Kripke-Platek set theory, which recall is defined as follows ( [38] , [42] , [13] p. 48, p. 36):
Definition 4.4. Kripke-Platek set theory or KP consists of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, the induction schema, the existence of finite Cartesian products and the ∆ 0 -separation and ∆ 0 -collection schemas.
To see that KP 1 implies KP, note that we can use Σ 1 -collection and Σ 0 -separation in KP 1 to give the usual proof of the existence of finite products (cf. [39] p. 13, [40] p. 27). To see that KP implies KP 1 , it suffices to recall that KP proves the Σ 1 -collection schema (cf. Devlin [13] Lemma I.11.3 p. 50). Now several of the classical results about KP easily generalize to KP n for all n ≥ 1. To state these results, we need to briefly recall the standard notation on definability. If M is a model in the signature of set theory and X ⊆ M k , then we say that X is Σ M n -definable (resp. Π M n -definable) if it is definable by a Σ n -formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k , p 1 , . . . , p j ) (resp. Π n -formula ϕ (x 1 , . . . , x k , p 1 , . . . , p j ) ) where p 1 , . . . , p j ∈ M are parameters. Further, something is said to be ∆ M n -definable if it is both Σ M n -definable and Π M n -definable. Having recalled this notation, we can then summarize the key facts about KP n as follows:
Proposition 4.5.
1. KP n proves Σ n -local collection and Π n-1 -separation.
2. KP n proves the ∆ n -separation schema.
3. KP n proves that the Σ m -and Π m -formulas are closed under bounded quantification for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n. In particular, for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n and all Γ ∈ {Σ, Π} and all Γ mformula ϕ(x, z, p) there are Γ m -formulas π(ϕ)(x , z, p) and σ(ϕ)(x , z, p) such that
4. KP n proves the Σ n -replacement schema (cf. Definition 4.1). More specifically, if M |= KP n and X ∈ M and f : X → M is Σ M n -definable, then both the range of f and the graph of f exist as elements of M .
5. KP n proves Σ n -Transfinite Recursion. That is, suppose that M |= KP n and suppose that the function G :
For the proofs of these results for the case n = 1, see Chapters I-II of Devlin's book [13] ; the proofs for the results n > 1 carry over word-for-word.
An idea closely related to transfinite recursion is Mostowksi Collapse. But it turns out that KP 1 is unable to prove the Mostowksi Collapse Lemma. So it is natural to formulate axioms pertaining directly to the Mostowski Collapse Lemma. In particular, we define: Definition 4.6. Axiom Beta says that for all sets X, E such that (X, E) is well-founded, there is a set π such that π is a function with domain X satisfying, for each y from X, the equation π(y) = {π(y ) : y ∈ X & y Ey} (cf. Barwise [2] Definition I.9.5 p. 39).
In models of KP 1 plus Axiom Beta, one can prove the set-version of the Mostowksi Collapse Lemma (as opposed to the class-version). The set-version of this lemma states that for all sets X, E such that (X, E) is well-founded and extensional, there is a transitive set M and an isomorphism π : (X, E) → (M, ∈) (cf. [39] pp. 105-106, [40] , [40] p. 56 ff, [34] p. 69). Further, it turns out that for a limit L α > ω to model Axiom Beta, it suffices that it is the limit of models L β of KP 1 (cf. Barwise [2] Exercise V.6.12 p. 177). Further, the traditional ZFC-proof of Axiom Beta uses Σ 1 -replacement and Σ 1 -separation and hence is reproducible in KP n for n ≥ 2. So we have that KP n for n ≥ 2 proves Axiom Beta.
Other basic properties of the structures L α relate to its canonical well-ordering < L . The well-order < L may be taken to be given by a canonical formula that is uniformly ∆ 1 in models of KP 1 + V=L and such that KP 1 + V=L proves that < L is a well-order of the universe. Since the structures L α are models of KP 1 + V=L, we thus have that each of these is well-ordered by < L . Further, since < L is uniformly ∆ 1 , we have that this well-order is absolute between the various models L α of KP 1 + V=L. Further, one has that the function x → pred < L (x) is uniformly ∆ 1 in models of KP 1 + V = L where we define y ∈ pred < L (x) iff y < L x (cf. Devlin [13] pp. 74-75). Finally, just as the Σ m and Π m -formulas are closed under bounded quantification for 0 ≤ m ≤ n in KP n (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 3), so for 0 < m ≤ n they are closed under < L -bounding in models of KP n + V=L. For the ease of future reference, let us include a formal statement of this result:
(Closure of Classes of Formulae under < L Bounding): KP n + V=L proves that the Σ m and Π m -formulas are closed under < L -bounding for all 0 < m ≤ n. In particular, for all 0 < m ≤ n and all Γ ∈ {Σ, Π} and all Γ n -formula ϕ(x, z, p) there are Γ nformulas π(ϕ)(x , z, p) and σ(ϕ)(x , z, p) such that
This result of course follows easily under V=L from the earlier result about bounding (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 3) and the complexity of the function x → pred < L (x) being ∆ 1 . The omission of the case m = 0 in this proposition is of course due to the fact that the function x → pred < (x) is ∆ 1 and not ∆ 0 .
Finally, given a model M |= KP 1 + V=L and n ≥ 0, consider the partial satisfaction relations Sat M Γn (x, y) where Γ ∈ {Σ, Π} is defined on codes for tuples x and codes for Gödel numbers y such that for all Γ n -formulas θ(x) and tuples a from M , one has Sat M Γn ( a , θ(x) ) iff M |= θ(a). Then one has the following result:
Other important properties of the models L α of KP 1 that we shall use are related to uniformization. A structure M satisfies Σ n -uniformization if for every Σ
In this case, R is called a Σ M n -definable uniformization of R. In his famous paper, Jensen showed that the structures L α |= KP are models of Σ n -uniformization (cf. [35] Proof. Suppose that we wish to uniformize the Σ m -relation R. Then write R(x, y) ≡ ∃ z S(x, y, z) where S is Π m-1 . Then define S as follows:
In the case m = 1, we can use the second equivalent definition of S to see that S is Σ 1 since ¬S is Σ 0 . In the case m > 1, we can use the first equivalent definition of S to see that S is Σ m since the Π m-1 -formulas are closed under bounded < L quantification by Proposition 4.7. So in either case, S is Σ m -definable with the same parameters as S. Then define R (x, y) ≡ ∃ z S (x, y, z), which is likewise Σ m -definable in the same parameters as is R. Then clearly R uniformizes R. 
Moreover, if L α |= KP n then the parameters used to define ι can be taken to be the same as the parameters defined to define π.
An important concept in what follows is the n-th projectum of the structure L α . This was introduced by Kripke ([38] ) and Platek ( [42] ), and it records how small one can possibly make α under a Σ n -definable injection: Definition 4.12. Suppose that n ≥ 0 and α > ω. Then the n-th projectum ρ n (α) = ρ n of α is the least ρ ≤ α such that there is a Σ Lα n -definable injection ι : α → ρ.
There are several different equivalent characterizations of the n-th projectum (cf. [43] p. 157, [2] Definition V.6.1 p. 174, [35] pp. 256-257, [44] Definition 2.1 p. 619). In particular, for models L α |= KP 1 , the n-th projectum may be equivalently defined as the smallest ρ ≤ α such that there is a Σ Lα n -definable injection ι : L α → ρ. This follows from the fact that if L α |= KP 1 then there is a Σ Lα 1 -definable injection ι : L α → α. To see this fact, note that part of the basic theory of initial segments of the constructible hierarchy is that there is is a Σ Lα 1 -definable surjection π : α → L α for limit α > ω (cf. Devlin [13] II.6.8 p. 93), to which we can then apply the Proposition on Right-Inverting a Surjection (Proposition 4.11) in the case where L α |= KP 1 .
Another basic tool that we employ is the notion of a Σ n -elementary substructure. Recall that if M and N are structures in the signature of ZFC, then M ≺ n N is said to hold, and N is said to be a Σ n -elementary substructure of N , if M ⊆ N and for every Σ n -formula ϕ(x) and every tuple of parameters a from M , it is the case that M |= ϕ(a) if and only if N |= ϕ(a). Here are some basic facts about Σ n -elementary substructures and the constructible hierarchy that we shall use: Proposition 4.13.
1. Gödel's Condensation Lemma: if α > ω is a limit and M ≺ 1 L α , then there is β ≤ α such that π : M → L β is an isomorphism and π X = id X for transitive X ⊆ M .
2. The Σ n -Definable Closure is a Σ n -Elementary Substructure: Suppose that L α |= KP n and A ⊆ L α . Let the Σ n -definable closure of L α with parameters A, written dcl Lα Σn (A), denote the set of elements a of L α such that there is a Σ n -formula ϕ(x, y) with all free variables displayed and In what follows, we also use the following consequence of V=L, which is proved in Devlin [13] Lemma II.5.10 p. 85 for the special case λ = ω: Proposition 4.14. Consequence of V=L for Σ 1 -Substructures of L up to a Successor Cardinal: Suppose that V=L and λ is an infinite cardinal and
Then M = L γ for some γ with |γ| = λ.
The notion of a Σ n -substructure is also useful for building models of KP n , and so we have the following proposition whose proof is routine:
Construction and Existence Theorems, and Joint Consistency Problem
The aim of this section is to build models of Σ 1 1 -LB (cf. Definition 2.6), and these yield our solution to the joint consistency problem described at the close of §2. The first step is the following construction. This construction is also an important part of the proof of our Main Theorem 2.10, whose proof is presented in the next section §6. In the statement of this construction theorem, the key concepts KP n and ρ n are respectively n-th level KripkePlatek set theory and the n-th projectum, both of which were defined in the previous section §4. Likewise, recall that the theories Σ 
is the < L -least member of X's E i -equivalence class. Then the following expansion of M is a model of the theory Σ 1 1 -[E 1 , . . . , E k ]A + GC where the global well order on objects is given by the membership relation < on the ordinal ρ:
Finally, if L α models Axiom Beta (Definition 4.6), then N models Aβ (Definition 2.9).
Proof. For each
So the graph of i is defined as follows:
Since adding quantifiers bounded by < L to Σ m -or Π m =formulas for m ≤ n does not increase their complexity in models of KP n +V=L (cf. Proposition 4.7), we have that the graph of i is defined by the conjunction of a Σ 
-definable). Now let us argue that the so-defined structure N from equation (5.2) satisfies the ab-
and hence its expansion N also models this. Conversely, suppose that N |= E i (X, Y ), so that its reduct M also models this. Then
. Hence in fact the structure N from equation (5.2) satisfies the abstraction principle A[E i ].
So now it remains to show that the structure N from equation (5.2) satisfies the FirstOrder Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) and the Σ 1 1 -Choice Schema (cf. Definition 2.4) in the signature containing the function symbols ∂ E 1 , . . . , ∂ E k . For the First-Order Comprehension Schema, suppose that X = {a ∈ ρ m : N |= ϕ(a)} where ϕ(x) is a formula in the signature of N with no higher-order quantifiers but perhaps with parameters. Now these higher-order parameters R may occur in ϕ(x) within terms such as
However, such terms determine Σ Lα n -definable maps from some Cartesian power of ρ to ρ and so by Σ n -replacement (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 4) exist as sets in L α ; and so we may replace these terms with these functions in the definition of X. When so replaced, the set X becomes a Σ 0 -definable subset of ρ m . Then by Σ 0 -separation in L α on the set ρ m , we have that X ∈ L α .
For the Σ 1 1 -choice schema, suppose that we have the following, wherein ϕ is Σ 1 1 :
Let us consider two cases. As a first case, let us suppose that ϕ contains no terms of the form ∂ E i (S[p, x, y]). In this case, since ϕ is Σ 1 1 , we may write it in terms of a formula ϕ 0 as follows:
In this we may assume the formula ϕ 0 (x, R, R 1 , . . . , R j , y 1 , z 1 , . . . , y j , z j ) contains no higher order quantifiers and does not contain any instances of the symbols ∂ E i for any i ∈ [1, k] . For the sake of readability we have assumed k = 2. The function symbols ∂ E i might have applied to R itself; but by introducing a further "dummy" existential variable S and replacing ϕ 0 by "R = S ∧ ϕ 0 ", we may assume that this too does not occur. R, R 1 , . . . , R j , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a j , b j 
Since γ has Σ Lα ndefinable graph, it follows from Σ n -replacement (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 4) in L α |= KP n that its graph is an element of L α . Since Γ is ∆ Lα 1 -definable from graph(γ ), we also have that Γ is an element of L α . Since Γ is an element of L α , and since the following set
Then we may argue that: N |= ∀x ϕ(x, R [x]). For, let x in ρ be fixed. By equation (5.6) and the definition of Γ in equation (5.8) 
wherein M[σ 1 , . . . , σ s ] denotes the expansion of the structure M by the new function symbols. Since this modification of Γ does not move it outside the complexity class Σ Lα n , the proof of the first case then carries over word-for-word.
As for the global choice principle GC, we may briefly note that N obviously satisfies it when we use the ordinary ordering < on the ordinal ρ as the witness. For, since the ordering < on ρ is ∆ 0 -definable, it exists in P (ρ × ρ) ∩ L α by ∆ 0 -separation on the set ρ × ρ in L α . In the previous paragraphs, we have verified that various forms of comprehension hold on N , in which parameters are allowed to occur. Hence these forms of comprehension continue to hold when < is permitted to occur within the formulas because we can view this as simply yet another parameter.
Finally, suppose that L α additionally models Axiom Beta (Definition 4.6). We must show that N models Aβ (Definition 2.9). So suppose that X is in P (ρ) ∩ L α and R is in P (ρ × ρ) ∩ L α and suppose that N models that (X, R) is well-founded. Then L α models that (X, R) is well-founded. Then by Axiom Beta, there is set π : X → L α in L α such that π(x) = {π(x ) : x ∈ X & R(x , x)}. So suppose that X 0 is an arbitrary non-empty subset of X, which need not necessarily be a member of L α . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that X 0 has no R-least member, so that x in X 0 implies there is x in X 0 with R(x , x), so that π(x ) ∈ π(x). Iterating this, we obtain an infinite descending sequence · · · ∈ π(x ) ∈ π(x ) ∈ π(x), which of course is impossible. So rather any non-empty subset of X must have an R-least member. Hence N models the axiom scheme Aβ.
This theorem can be seen as a generalization of our earlier constructions of models of Σ be the least non-computable ordinal. Then L α |= KP 1 + ¬Axiom Beta and one has P (ω) ∩ L α = HYP.
Further, ρ 1 (α) = ω and there is a Σ
where O is Kleene's O and Form is the set of Gödel numbers of first-order formulas in the signature of set theory.
Finally, there is an injection χ : ω → π −1 ({0, 1}) whose graph is an element of L α .
Proof. For the result about KP 1 , see [43] 
In this, ·, . . . , · denotes Gödel's Σ . Moreover, we are appealing to Devlin [13] Lemma II.3.1 p. 72 which says that we may take the parameters within ϕ in the above equation to be ordinals.
Regarding the injection χ : ω → π −1 ({0, 1}), let ϕ k (x) say "x = 0 and there are exactly k ordinals." Let a k be an element of O such that
. Then looking at its definition in equation (5.12), we see that π(χ(k)) = 1 since x ∈ 1 iff x = 0 iff L k |= ϕ k (x). Hence, the injection χ has codomain π −1 ({0, 1}). Since graph(χ) is a definable subset of L ω , we have that graph(χ) is an element of L α .
The extra information about the injection χ : ω → π −1 ({0, 1}) will be primarily useful for our later paper [50] , where we use constructible sets to build models of an intensional type theory. In the language of that later paper, the information about the injection shows us there are intensional hierarchies which are expressive (cf. §5 of [50] ). We also record similar information in the statement of the subsequent theorem (Theorem 5.3).
The primary difference the proof of Theorem 5.1 and our earlier constructions of models of Σ . Then for each n ≥ 1 there is a α n such that
More specifically, we can choose α n so that L αn = dcl Lκ Σn (λ ∪ {λ}). Further, the following set F n ⊆ λ is Σ Lα n 1 -definable, wherein ·, · : λ × λ → λ is Gödel's Σ 1 -definable pairing function and Form(Σ n ) is the set of Gödel numbers of Σ n -formulas:
Further, the sequence α n is strictly increasing. Finally, for each n ≥ 1 there is injection χ n :
Proof. Since the result is absolute, we may assume V=L, and hence we may assume that λ and κ are cardinals. Since κ is regular uncountable one has that L κ |= ZFC-P (cf. Proposition 4.13, item 3). Let M = dcl Lκ Σn (λ ∪ {λ}). Since the Σ n -definable closure is a Σ nelementary substructure (cf. Proposition 4.13, item 2), we have M ≺ n L κ . Then it follows from Proposition 4.15 that M |= KP n + Axiom Beta. Since κ = λ + and λ ∪ {λ} ⊆ M and M ≺ 1 L λ + , it follows from the consequence of V=L for Σ 1 -substructures of L up to a successor cardinal (Proposition 4.14)) that M = L αn where |α n | = λ. Then λ ≤ α n < κ. But since λ ∈ M = L αn we have λ < α n < κ.
Then define the following relation
It follows from the result on partial satisfaction predicates (cf. Proposition 4.8) that R n is Σ Lα n n -definable. Then by Weak Uniformization (Proposition 4.10), choose a Σ Lα n n -definable uniformization θ n : F n L αn of R n . Then θ n is a surjective partial function. For, suppose that a ∈ L αn . Since L αn = dcl Lκ Σn (λ ∪ {λ}), there is Σ n -formula ϕ(x, y, z) and β < λ such that
Then L αn |= ∃ x ϕ(x, β, λ) and ϕ(x, y, z) , β is in F n . Then on the input u = ϕ(x, y, z) , β , we have that θ n (u) is defined and if θ n (u) = a then L αn |= ϕ(a , β, λ). But in conjunction with equation (5.17) , it thus follows that a = a = θ n (u). Hence, indeed θ n : F n L αn is a surjective partial function. Let F n ⊆ F n be the domain of θ n , which is likewise Σ Lα n ndefinable. By the Proposition on Right-Inverting a Surjection (Proposition 4.11), it follows that there is a Σ Lα n n -definable injection ι n : L αn → F n such that θ n •ι n = id Lα n . Since F n ⊆ λ, we then have that ρ n (α n ) ≤ λ. Since λ is a cardinal and L αn has cardinality λ, we must have then that ρ n (α n ) = λ.
Now we argue that
, we have that L αn ⊆ L α n+1 and hence that α n ≤ α n+1 . Suppose that it was not always that case that α n < α n+1 for all n ≥ 1. Then α n = α n+1 for some n ≥ 1. Since L α n+1 |= KP n+1 and L αn = L α n+1 , we have that L αn |= KP n+1 and so satisfies Σ n -separation. Hence F n ∈ L αn and hence by Σ nreplacement (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 4) applied to the Σ Lα n n -definable surjection θ n : F n → L αn we would have that L αn is a member of itself, a contradiction.
Finally, we verify that for each n ≥ 1 there is injection χ n : λ → θ −1 n ({0, 1}). Let ϕ(x, y, z) say "x = 0 and y is an ordinal." Then for each β < λ there is exactly one x in L αn such that L αn |= ϕ(x, β, λ). Then by equation (5.15) we have that ϕ(x, y, z) , β ∈ dom(θ n ) and we have by equation (5.15 ) that θ n ( ϕ(x, y, z) , β ) = 0. Then define the function χ n :
n ({0, 1}) by χ n (β) = ϕ(x, y, z) , β , which is clearly injective; further clearly the graph of χ is in L αn .
Finally, we can now prove the main results on the consistency of abstraction principles in the predicative setting. These were first stated and motivated in §3. As for the Joint Consistency Theorem 3.5, this follows directly from the Existence Theorem 5.3 and the Construction Theorem 5.1. As for Theorem 3.3, this is a limiting case of the Joint Consistency Theorem 3.5.
Identifying the Well-Founded Extensions
The goal of this section is to establish the Main Theorem 2.10 from §2. This is done in two steps: (i) first by identifying in Theorem 6.1 the well-founded extensions within models induced via the Construction Theorem 5.1 from L α , and (ii) second in Theorem 6.2 by an identification within models satisfying Axiom Beta (cf. Definition 4.6). The basic idea of these proofs is to relate the notion Trcl η (x) from §2 equation (2.11) defined in the object-language of a model of Σ 1 1 -LB to the notion trcl η (x) defined in the meta-language. In particular, given an arbitrary relation R, the notion trcl R (x) is defined to the be the set of all y such that there is a finite sequence x 0 , . . . , x n such that x 0 = y and x n = x and x m-1 Rx m for all m ≤ n. So a model N of Σ 1 1 -LB induces a specific relation η via the definition of the Fregean membership relation from equation (2.7), and then trcl η (x) is defined to be trcl R (x) with R = η. Finally, recall that the well-founded extensions wfExt were defined in (2.15).
Suppose also that ρ < α. Then the structure
is a model of Σ 1 1 -LB + GC, where the global well-order on objects is given by the membership relation on ρ. Further:
, and its image is:
Finally, the isomorphism j : (L α , ∈) → (wfExt * (N ), η) is the inverse of the Mostowski collapse π : (wfExt
For the statement of the Mostowski collapse theorem, see the discussion immediately following the definition of Axiom Beta (Definition 4.6).
Proof. By the Construction Theorem 5.1, the structure N is a model of Σ 1 1 -LB. Now we argue for the identity in equation (6.2) . To see this identity, let us first show both of the following, wherein x is an arbitrary element of ρ:
For equation (6.4) , suppose that w ∈ trcl η (x) and suppose that
We must show that w ∈ F . Since w ∈ trcl η (x), choose a sequence y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ ρ such that y 1 = w and y n = x and y i ηy i+1 for all i < n. Then we may show by induction on 0 < k ≤ n-1 that y n−k ∈ F . For equation (6.5) , first define a map τ : P (ρ) → P (ρ) by
Now, it follows from the proposition on the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7) that the map τ has the following property:
Let us note one further property of the map τ , namely its connection to transitive closure:
To see this, suppose that U ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ L α ). First consider the left-to-right direction of the identity. Suppose that y ∈ trcl η (∂(U )). Then there are y 1 , . . . , y n where y 1 = y and y n = ∂(U ) and y i ηy i+1 for i < n. By induction on 0 < k ≤ n-1 we may then show that y n-k ∈ τ (k-1) (U ). Second, consider the right-to-left direction of the identity in equation (6.9) . For this one simply shows by induction on n ≥ 0, that τ (n) (U ) ⊆ trcl η (∂(U )).
Turning now to the verification of equation (6.5) , suppose that
So that in particular ∂(X) = x for some X ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ L α ). Now we argue that τ (n) (X) ∈ L α for all n ≥ 0. Clearly this holds for n = 0, since by hypothesis one has that τ (0) (X) = X ∈ L α . Suppose, for the induction step, that τ (n) (X) ∈ L α . Then by equation (6.9) and equation (6.10) we can collect together the following information about τ (n) (X):
Then we can deduce immediately from equation (6.8) that τ n+1 (X) = τ (τ n (X)) ∈ L α . So now we have finished arguing that τ (n) (X) ∈ L α for all n ≥ 0. By appealing repeatedly to the proposition on the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7), one has that L α models that for all n < ω there is a sequence U 0 , S 0 , . . . , U n , S n of elements of
Let n < ω and let U 0 , S 0 , . . . , U n , S n be such a sequence. We argue by induction on m ≤ n that U m = τ (m) (X). Clearly this holds for m = 0 by equation (6.13). Suppose it holds for m < n. To see it holds for m + 1, note that equation (6.12) and equation (6.14) and the induction hypothesis imply
So consider the following function f : ω → L α defined as follows: f (m) = U iff there is a sequence U 0 , S 0 , . . . , U m , S m satisfying (6.12)-(6.14) such that U = U m . Then the graph of f is Σ Lα n -definable and so by Σ n -replacement (cf. Proposition 4.5, item 4), its graph exists as a set in L α . Hence the infinite sequence
. is an element of L α and so by equation (6.9), one also has that trcl η (x) = trcl η (∂(X)) ∈ L α . So we have finished now the verification of equation (6.5).
Now we proceed to the verification of equation (6.2). Suppose first x ∈ wfExt(N ), whose membership conditions are as defined in equation (2.16) , so that
By equation (6.4), we automatically have that
Hence from equation (6.5), we may conclude that trcl η (x) ∈ L α . Note that if we set F = trcl η (x) then F satisfies the following condition:
Since F ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ L α ), it follows that the converse to equation (6.4) holds as well, so that we may conclude that
Then there is some nonempty ∆ Lα n -definable subset Z of (trcl η (x) ∪ {x}, η) which has no η-least member. By ∆ nseparation in L α on the set (trcl η (x) ∪ {x}) ∈ L α , we have Z ∈ P (ρ) ∩ L α , which contradicts the previous equation and the supposition from equation (6.17). So we just completed the verification of the left-to-right direction of equation (6.2). For the right-to-left direction, suppose that x ∈ ρ and Further, since ∂ : L α → ρ is an injection, we may argue that j : L α → ρ is an injection. For, let x be the ∈-minimal element of L α such that there is x = x with j(x) = j(x ). But since ∂ : L α → ρ is an injection, it follows that {j(y) : y ∈ x} = {j(y ) : y ∈ x }. Now suppose that y ∈ x. Then j(y) = j(y ) for some y ∈ x . Then by ∈-minimality of x we may conclude that y = y ∈ x . Hence x ⊆ x , and the argument that x ⊆ x is parallel. Hence, we have shown that x = x , contrary to hypothesis. Since j : L α → ρ is an injection, we may conclude:
(6.24) y ∈ x ⇐⇒ j(y)ηj(x)
For, we already had the left-to-right direction in equation (6.23) . To see the right-to-left direction, suppose that j(y)ηj(x). Since j(y)ηj(x) and j(x) = ∂({j(y ) : y ∈ x}), we have that j(y) ∈ {j(y ) : y ∈ x}. Then j(y) = j(y ) for some y ∈ x. Since j is injective, we have y = y , so that y ∈ x. Since we have verified equation (6.24), we may conclude that j : L α → ρ is indeed an embedding. Now we argue that j : L α → wfExt * (N ). First let us show:
Let x ∈ L α and let y ∈ trcl η (j(x)). Then there are y 1 , . . . , y n in ρ with y 1 = y and y n = j(x) and y 1 ηy 2 , . . . y n-1 ηy n . Then using the definition of j from equation (6.22) we may argue by induction that y i = j(x i ) for x i ∈ L α . Let us now argue that (6.26) x ∈ L α =⇒ (trcl η (j(x)) ∪ {j(x)}, η) is well-founded For, suppose that there was an infinite descending η-sequence y n in the set (trcl η (j(x)) ∪ {j(x)}) ⊆ rng(j). Then by equation (6.24) this would lead to an infinite descending ∈-sequence. Before proceeding, let's note that η is well-founded on wfExt * (N ). For, suppose that ∅ = X ⊆ wfExt * (N ). Choose x with Xx, so that of course x is in wfExt * (N ). Then consider X = X ∩ (trcl η (x) ∪ {x}), which is a non-empty subset of trcl η (x) ∪ {x}. So there is some x 0 with X x 0 such that yηx 0 implies ¬X y. Suppose that yηx 0 with Xy. Since x 0 is in trcl η (x)∪ {x} and yηx 0 , we have that y is in (trcl η (x)∪{x}). Then of course y is in X = X ∩(trcl η (x)∪ {x}), which is a contradiction. So indeed η is well-founded on wfExt * (N ). Now let us argue that j : L α → wfExt * (N ) is surjective. First note that it follows from the definitions that the class wfExt * (N ) is transitive in the following sense: X = {x ∈ X : j(x) ∈ Y } = {x ∈ X : ∀ y ∈ (L α \ Y ) j(x) = y} Also {j(x) : x ∈ X } = Y , so that we have (6.32) j(X ) = ∂({j(x) : x ∈ X }) = ∂(Y ) = y which contradicts the hypothesis that y was not in the image of j. Now we show that the bijection j : (L α , ∈) → (wfExt * (N ), η) is the inverse of the Mostowski collapse π : (wfExt * (N ), η) → (L α , ∈). First let us note why the hypotheses of the Mostowski collapse theorem are satisfied (cf. statement of theorem immediately following the definition of Axiom Beta (Definition 4.6). We argued earlier that η is well-founded on wfExt * (N ). Further, it follows from the transitivity of wfExt * (N ) (6.27) that we have η is extensional on wfExt * (N ). So by the Mostowski collapse theorem, we obtain a transitive set M and an isomorphism π : (wfExt * (N ), η) → (M, ∈). Now we show that π(j(x)) = x for all x ∈ L α , from which it follows that the collapse map π : (wfExt * (N ), η) → (L α , ∈) has codomain L α and is surjective. Suppose it is false that π(j(x)) = x for all x ∈ L α . Then let x be ∈-minimal counterexample. Since j : (L α , ∈) → (wfExt * (N ), η) is an isomorphism we have that: 
is a model of Σ So suppose that x ∈ ρ satisfies the hypothesis of this conditional. Then define the set X = (trcl η (x) ∪ {x}), which is in L α by (6.5) of the previous proof. Then by the proposition on the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7), choose binary relation E X ∈ L α such that E X ⊆ V × X and such that Xa implies E X (b, a) iff bηa. Since X is η-transitive, we have that E X ⊆ X × X. Then the hypothesis that (trcl η (x) ∪ {x}, η) is ∆ Lα n -well-founded and the η-transitivity of X implies (6.36) L α |= (X, E X ) is well-founded and extensional
Since the structure L α satisfies Axiom Beta, the structure L α satisfies the Mostowski Collapse Theorem (cf. discussion following Definition 4.6). Then there is a transitive set M in L α and a map π in L α such that π : (X, η) → (M, ∈) is an isomorphism. Suppose that (X, E X ) is not well-founded. Then there is an infinite decreasing η-sequence x i in X ⊆ L α . Then π(x i ) is an infinite decreasing ∈-sequence.
